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No one likes to call someone a liar. But the authors of the tipping point account (ten 
Brinke, Vohs, & Carney, 2016) claim that it is evolutionary prudent to spot lies that can harm 
us in order to determine who to trust. As such, they propose the reputational costs of 
confronting a liar might be overcome by detecting lies unconsciously. When confronted with 
information that creates a threat response, the unconscious can use the threat response to 
detect deceptive cues and to unconsciously infer deception, all the while keeping this 
information out of the conscious mind. The account suggests this is beneficial because 
conscious awareness of the deception “could impel the perceiver to confront the liar” (p. 
580).  
The account is controversial insofar as it claims that people can detect deception, in 
contrast to past work showing otherwise (47% detection rate of lies, and 61% of truths, 
resulting from bias to judge statements as true: Bond & DePaulo, 2006), and also makes 
novel claims about an unconscious ability. Although it is welcoming to see new theoretical 
approaches to lie detection, the account (a) makes claims that do not match the data and 
conclusions presented in the studies cited to build its case, (b) offers no testable definition of 
unconscious processes, and (c) contains internal contradictions. 
The first issue is with the mismatch between what the studies found and what the 
tipping point authors are interpreting from them. For instance, ten Brinke et al. (2016) 
interpret work on nonhuman animals (primates and canines) as showing that nonconscious 
thinking can detect deception (Takoaka, Maeda, Hori, & Fujita, 2015; Wheeler, 2010), and 
predict that, for example, “Canine behavior will reveal a preference for approaching truth-
tellers and avoiding liars” (p. 582). However, the cited works do not explore deception or lie 
detection. Takoaka et al. (2015) trained dogs to go to a container that concealed food, 
identified by a person pointing at the correct container. After training, the dogs are shown 
which container is baited, and then a person points to the wrong container. The dogs correctly 
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choose the baited container. Is the canine drawing on knowledge of deception, or is this 
evidence that dogs do not use unreliable information when they have more robust information 
available (i.e., having seen which container is baited)? We, and the original authors, would 
argue for the latter. Similarly, ten Brinke et al. cite Wheeler (2010) in support of the claim 
that “[n]onhuman primates can detect deception at higher rates than humans” (p. 582). But 
this study does not test deception or lie detection, let alone compare human and primate 
performance. 
In the same vein, neuropsychological work is cited (specifically, Grèzes, Berthoz, & 
Passingham, 2006; Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004; Lissek et al., 2008) to argue that 
brain- or body-based physiological responses occur when observing deception. This may 
seem to suggest that people are unconsciously responding to deception. But in these studies 
participants were explicitly made aware of the possibility of deception and were asked to 
make lie-truth judgments, sometimes reaching 100% accuracy. It is not clear how one would 
show that the physiological activity is not indicative of the conscious judgment they were 
asked to make. 
The largest body of evidence supporting unconscious lie detection stems from the 
indirect method. Participants are not consciously informed about the possibility of deception. 
Instead, they judge whether the speaker, for instance, appears to be thinking hard. These 
studies find that judgments of thinking hard (or some other indirect judgment of deception) 
distinguishes liars and truth-tellers more accurately than an explicit lie-truth judgment. ten 
Brinke et al. cite work showing that people feel less comfortable and more suspicious (two 
indirect judgments) when viewing their friends’ deceptions compared to viewing their truths, 
but were at chance accuracy in making an explicit lie-truth judgment (Anderson, DePaulo, & 
Ansfield, 2002). It would appear that the rater cannot explicitly distinguish lies from truths, 
but feels uncomfortable when listening to lies, which might suggest some form of 
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unconscious knowledge. However, Anderson and colleagues demonstrated that their result 
was a methodological effect attributable to the fact that the scale used to collect explicit 
ratings was less sensitive than the one used for indirect ratings, an effect which has been 
found in a meta-analysis (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). In fact, indirect lie detection often 
performs worse than direct lie detection (Bond, Levine, & Hartwig, 2015; Levine & Bond, 
2014), and can be explained by entirely conscious processes (Street & Richardson, 2015; 
Street & Vadillo, 2016). 
To the best of our knowledge, only two of the studies cited by ten Brinke et al. 
(Reinhard, Greifeneder, & Scharmach, 2013; ten Brinke et al., 2014) contain unambiguous 
evidence in favour of unconscious lie detection. But the reliability of these two findings has 
been called into question by failures to replicate the former (Moi & Shanks, 2015) and 
several oddities in the analysis of the latter (Franz & von Luxburg, 2015; see also Levine & 
Bond, 2014). 
The second issue with the tipping point account is its falsifiability. The authors offer 
two and a half pages of predictions, but unfortunately, none of them test whether the effect is 
unconscious. For instance, it is predicted that, “[e]xperiencing social exclusion will enhance 
accuracy” (p.583). If this prediction was supported, we cannot know whether it arises from 
unconscious thinking. The authors do not explain what the unconscious is or how it is 
possible to test whether the unconscious is involved. There is an active and ongoing debate 
around whether the unconscious exists (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2014). Because of the lack of 
a definition of what the unconscious is, how it could be measured, or how it should work, the 
tipping point theory’s claim to the unconscious is unfalsifiable. 
The third issue with the account is that there are a number of inconsistencies. For 
example, it is predicted that increasing reputational and relationship costs of accusing others 
of deception should detriment accuracy: “When social norms shift and license people to catch 
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liars, thus attenuating the social costs of declaring someone a liar, accuracy improves” (p. 
586). But the account also attempts to harness findings showing that when the costs to the 
relationship are perceived to be particularly high, accuracy actually improves, citing Ein-Dor 
and Perry (2013). It seems difficult to reconcile these two contradictory positions. 
While a threat to the self may engage the unconscious to help detect the lie, an 
overwhelming threat may lead people to be suspicious and judge whatever they hear to be a 
lie, even at the expense of accuracy. What is an overly potent threat? The authors cite work 
showing that police officers are biased to judge ‘lie’ when rating footage of students 
committing mock theft and vandalism (Meissner & Kassin, 2002). If this is sufficiently 
threatening to overwhelm any accuracy effects, the level of threat that the unconscious has 
evolved to detect seems particularly benign. Yet deception gets people to offer up their 
financial details (Wright, Chakraborty, Basoglu, & Marett, 2010) and being person-trafficked 
(Hübschle, 2014; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). These are potent threats 
that should create a lie bias, but people seem to believe the persuader. 
The tipping point account acknowledges that the threat response only allows higher 
accuracy “when cues to deception are present and perceptible” (ten Brinke et al., 2016, 
p.580). That threat may make people judge statements as lies (a ‘lie bias’) is consistent with 
current theories that do not rely on unconscious processing . The effect of threats creating a 
lie bias is consistent with the context-general information use of ALIED theory (Street, 2015) 
and with the concept of triggers in truth-default theory (Levine, 2014), neither of which 
require a claim to the unconscious. The suggestion that the social repercussions of accusing 
others may cause a truth bias has been made by O’Sullivan (2003; O’Sullivan, Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1988) without claiming there is an unconscious element. While the accusatory 
reluctance position has been suggested in the literature, it has received little to no direct 
empirical testing. A useful contribution of the tipping point theory, then, is to make explicit a 
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number of predictions that could test for the presence of accusatory reluctance (see Box 1). 
But this exploration can take place without reference to an undefined hidden process (Street 
& Vadillo, 2016). 
Given that the predictions may just as easily be accommodated by conscious processes, 
why does the account argue for an unconscious process? The authors suggest that “if cues to 
deception enter into consciousness, they could impel the perceiver to confront the liar.” (p. 
580). But, consciousness is not impelled to communicate. People are capable of holding 
conscious thoughts without making them public. In fact, one might even call this a definition 
of deception: To be aware that what one is saying does not match with what one believes to 
be true. 
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